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Abstract 
Alain Badiou’s Maoism has long been the subject of controversy. In this paper, we approach the topic 
of Badiou’s Maoism by way of the references he and his erstwhile Maoist group, the UCFML, made to 
the 1967 Shanghai Commune. We argue that Badiou and the UCFML’s invocations of Mao and Mao’s 
writings are subordinate to their interpretation of the political stakes of the Shanghai Commune as a 
privileged episode in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. We proceed by comparing Badiou and 
the UCFML to two of the most prominent French Maoist groups, the PCMLF and the GP, before 
situating Badiou’s use of Mao’s name within the conceptual terms of his 1982 work Theory of the 
Subject.  
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In addition to being one of the world’s most celebrated contemporary philosophers, 
Alain Badiou is infamous for his fidelity to Maoism, a political movement he actively 
participated in for well over a decade and which remains a constant reference point in 
his later work. 1  A number of invectives, polemics, expressions of incredulity and 
hagiographic defences have been devoted to this topic in recent years. 2  Our own 
attempt to explain Badiou’s Maoism will take a slightly different approach to existing 
scholarship. We aim to engage with the topic of Badiou’s Maoism by way of his 
repeated invocation of a singular event in political history, one that occurred exactly 
fifty years after the Russian Revolution: the Shanghai Commune of 1967.3 Indeed, our 
contention will be that Badiou’s Maoism can only be understood if the figure of Mao, 
along with the Maoist works on which Badiou draws, are seen as subordinate to his 
                                                        
1 For a relatively recent statement by Badiou on his Maoist activities and convictions, see Badiou 2010, pp.101-
105.  
2 For excellent existing scholarship on this topic, see the 2005 edition of positions: east asia cultures critique 
devoted to Badiou and his Maoist group, the UCFML, in particular the article by Bruno Bosteels, Bosteels 2005: 
positions: east asia culture critique, edited by Bruno Bosteels. Alain Badiou and Cultural Revolution, special 
issue of positions: east asia culture critique, 13 (2005), pp. 576-634. See also Bourseiller 2008, Wolin 2010 and 
Laruelle 2013. 
3 Badiou has recently composed a preface to Hongsheng Jiang’s book on the Commune, La Commune de 
Shanghai et la Commune de Paris. See Jiang 2014, pp. 21-34, in which he discusses the Commune at length. See 





understanding of the Commune as both an event and an inquiry into the possibilities 
of communist politics. Our aim in this paper will therefore be to explain the priority of 
the Commune in Badiou’s understanding of Mao and Maoism. To showcase the 
importance of the Commune in Badiou’s discourse, consider the following passage 
from his book Theory of the Subject, where he implicitly invokes the Commune in 
order to distinguish his reading of Hegel’s dialectic from structuralism: 
…neither I nor Hegel are structuralists. I think, for example, that, in its 
antagonistic determination that is specific to the new revisionist bourgeoisie, 
the proletariat emerges as a positive newness. This happens, timidly, during 
May ’68 in France, and, with great uproar, in January 1967 in China—for 
instance, in the guise of a thoroughly transformed Marxism (Maoism) (Badiou 
2009, p. 11).4 
How are we to understand the link Badiou establishes here between May ’68 and the 
Shanghai Commune, two events that are separated both temporally and 
geographically? In what sense do they portend and even necessitate a new Maoist 
future for Marxism? While Badiou has long been read as a typical French fetishist of 
the events of May ’68, we argue that these events are actually significant to him only to 
the extent that they echo and attempt to verify the events of their Chinese predecessor 
and prototype. But what was it about these events that allowed Badiou to build a bridge 
between the Chinese and French situations? Answering this question involves 
returning to the phenomenon of French Maoism in general. The first part of our paper 
will therefore be devoted to sketching the political space of French Maoism with a view 
to situating Badiou, along with his erstwhile political organisation, the UCFML (Union 
des communistes français marxiste-léniniste), within it. Following this, we will 
compare Badiou’s Maoism to the two most prominent French Maoist groups: the 
PCMLF (Parti communiste marxiste-léniniste français) and the GP (Gauche 
prolétarienne). We will draw both on the UCFML’s collective publications, in 
particular its retrospective ‘Ten Years of Maoism’, and Badiou’s Theory of the Subject. 
The latter is a hybrid work of philosophy, militant politics, psychoanalysis and poetic 
and dramatic criticism. Yet it is above all a work that emerged from—at the same time 
as it provided a sophisticated theorisation of—the political practices of the UCFML, 
whose full name was in fact the ‘Group for the Foundation of the Union of French 
Communists, Marxist-Leninist’. We will return to the significance of this name below.5 
Badiou himself was, if not the leader, then a significant member of the Group’s inner 
circle (Bourseiller 2008, p. 215). In light of this, we contend that the philosophical 
positions defended in Theory of the Subject are best understood as a theoretical 
systematisation of the Group’s specifically French Maoist politics. Unfortunately, 
however, Theory of the Subject has seldom been read as a significant expression of 
French Maoism, no doubt due to a combination of both its forbidding complexity and 
the fact that the published text, along with the seminar sessions from which it was 
derived, come several years after what historians typically consider to be the French 
Maoist moment. 6  For us, by contrast, the philosophical sophistication of the text, 
combined with the fact that it constitutes a sort of post-mortem of the Maoist moment 
written by one of its key participants, might well help to deepen and perhaps even shift 
our understanding of the repercussions of the Chinese experience of socialism on 
                                                        
4 For other occasions where the Shanghai Commune is explicitly mentioned in Theory of the Subject, see Badiou 
2009, pp. 8, 231. 
5 For Badiou’s own discussion of the Group’s name, see Badiou 2011, pp. 8-10. 
6 For the best discussion of the book’s relation to Maoism, see Bosteels 2011. 
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political life in the Hexagon. Similarly, no extensive study of the UCFML’s position 
within the field of French Maoism currently exists.7 The group’s extant publications 
remain for the most part both untranslated and difficult to find,8 while the political 
struggles in which it was engaged are fading from popular and even scholarly memory. 
Our paper therefore aims to rectify these two omissions by way of a simultaneous study 
of key philosophical moments from Theory of the Subject and the UCFML’s political 
practice. In what sense were Badiou and his Group Maoists? And what role did the 
Shanghai Commune of 1967 play in both inspiring and orienting their politics? 
* 
As scholars from Christophe Bourseiller to Richard Wolin have described, if the 
Chinese experience of socialism—filtered as it was the through the powerful proper 
name of Mao Tse-tung—resonated so strongly with sections of the French left both 
before and after May ’68, then this was because Maoism was thought to involve a 
critique of Soviet socialism; to provide backing to Third Worldist ideas that might 
deserve the adherence of those who had fought in anti-colonial struggles; and to 
propose a series of directives, such as “serving the people”, which promised to 
rejuvenate a moribund Marxism. Presenting themselves as the true inheritors of 
Leninism in a period where the Soviets, following the death of Stalin in 1953 and 
Khrushchev’s secret speech of 1956, were pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the 
Chinese were seen, through the eyes of some on the anti-Stalinist French left, as 
inhabiting a vibrant socialist society that compared favourably to the glacial 
bureaucratism of the USSR (Wolin 2010, pp. 11-15). This sentiment was compounded 
in the French situation by the perceived reactionary drift of the PCF, a perception 
reinforced by the Communist’s collaboration with the Gaullists in the return to order 
following May ’68. The key directive the French Maoists received from the Chinese 
after the Sino-Soviet split—or, alternatively, after the Cultural Revolution—was the 
necessity of struggling on two fronts; that is, of struggling against the “two 
bourgeoisies”, the “old” and the “new” (UCFML 1981a, p. 30, UCFML 1981b, pp. 81). 
For the French Maoists, any communist political struggle would be handicapped if it 
allowed itself to be co-opted by the “new bureaucratic bourgeoisie” (Badiou 2009, p. 
11) made up of the PCF, a satellite of the CPSU, and its accompanying trade union, the 
CGT. In the Maoists’ eyes, these institutions were “revisionist”, not “revolutionary”. 
Their nominal adherence to the communist cause hid the fact that they ultimately 
functioned to render the working class’ interests and political prospects homogenous 
to post-War capitalism. As Badiou writes in Theory of the Subject, “revisionism […] is 
never anything but the specific and homogenous form, adapted to the working class, 
of the general bourgeois and imperialist splace” (Badiou 2009, p. 9). Given that, in the 
final analysis, the tactics and strategy of the PCF-CGT were almost entirely dictated by 
Moscow, the French Maoists were undoubtedly correct in their low estimation of the 
PCF and the CGT’s effectiveness in advancing the cause of French progressive 
movements during this period. Specifically, the Soviet policies of détente and of a 
peaceful transition to socialism meant that the PCF-CGT had to adopt a set of 
interlinked economic, political and ideological directives, which coalesced to make the 
                                                        
7 Bourseiller devotes only a few pages to discussing the UCFML: see Bourseiller 2008, pp. 215, 397-402. Wolin’s 
book, despite devoting an entire ‘Excursus’ to Badiou, has little to say about the UCFML’s actual activities. See 
Wolin 2010, pp. 155-167. Again, Bosteels’ work is doubtless the best existing study of the UCFML in relation to the 
two other major Maoist groups, the PCMLF and the GP. See in particular Bosteels, 2005, pp. 588, 629-630. We 
hope in the present article to extend and deepen Bosteels’ insights.  
8 Selections of their writings have nevertheless been translated and published in the 2005 edition of positions: 





Communists an ultimately conservative political force. That said, the intellectual arm 
of the PCF did not present these wild oscillations in doctrine and policy as if they were 
simply the shibboleths of their subservience to the Soviets. Instead, Communist 
intellectuals argued that mutations in post-War capitalism had made a peaceful 
transition to socialism eminently possible. Correlatively, revolution and the 
dictatorship of the proletariat were no longer necessary. The centrepiece of their 
argument was the theory of state-monopoly capitalism.9 For the PCF-CGT, the post-
War era represented a new era in capitalism, one that was characterised by planning, 
nationalisations and social welfare, all of which were processes that had subtracted 
substantial sectors of the economy from the law of profit. The key contradiction in 
capitalist society was now between ownership by big capital and ownership by the 
state, not between capital and labour. The PCF-CGT sought, therefore, to extend the 
domain of the economy already under public control by parliamentary means and the 
actions of the union bureaucracy. In Marxism-Leninism and Revisionism Faced With 
the Economic Crisis, a collective work of economic analysis published by a group of 
researchers closely associated with the UCFML, Badiou’s Maoist comrades describe 
this strategy and its underlying theory as follows: 
For the revisionists, the whole of the state-managed sector no longer functions 
as capital, because it ‘has the possibility of acting without taking into account 
the law of profit’. […] This is the meaning of the major revisionist dilemma: 
‘Public service or service of monopolies?’ This is the reason for their watchword: 
‘No to the privatization of public services’ (Groupe Yenan-économie 1976, p. 
88).10 
The theory of state-monopoly capitalism, or STAMOCAP as it was colloquially known, 
gave intellectual cover to the policies demanded of the PCF by the PCSU. As the Maoists 
understood, the political corollary of all this was the denial of any “antagonistic 
contradiction” (Badiou 2009, p. 24) between capitalism and the transition to socialism 
and communism, along with a decidedly un-Marxist elevation of the bourgeois state to 
the status of an asylum from—rather than an instrument of—the depredations of 
international capital.  
A set of sins thus made it impossible for the Maoists to consider the PCF-CGT the 
bearers of the egalitarian-universalist ideal of which they claimed to be the inheritors. 
These same failings also justified the Maoists denouncing these traditional 
organisations as the “new bourgeoisie” (UCFML 1981a, p. 30). The PCF was associated 
with the worst of Stalinism and Soviet imperialism; it had a poor history on the colonial 
question; had abandoned the political primacy of revolution; and most recently had 
stifled the flame of May ’68. For their part, the CGT were seen by the Maoists as 
systematically keeping the demands of workers below a certain antagonistic threshold 
so as to maintain the Communist’s objective collusion with the state’s protectionist 
policies. The watchword of the Communist-backed union, as Badiou wrote in a 1976 
pamphlet, was “negotiation”. What this meant was “precluding as a matter of necessity 
taking the contradiction between classes to its extreme” (Badiou 2012, p. 187) in the 
course of a union’s campaign to improve wages and conditions. Whatever local 
successes the CGT enjoyed, the union’s strategy of “negotiation” ultimately meant that 
its actions could never achieve anything beyond shoring up the Communists’ power 
                                                        
9 For a superb discussion of the theory of state-monopoly capitalism and its critique by the UCFML, see Walker 
2012. 
10 Cited in Walker 2012, p. 54. 
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within the existing parliamentary and capitalist regime. The contradiction between 
bosses and unionised workers was an example of a “weak” or “structural” 
contradiction, not a “strong” contradiction that might lead to the destruction of the 
society that had given birth to the struggling parties. The reference here is to Mao’s 
model of “antagonistic contradiction” from On Contradiction (Badiou 2009, p. 25). As 
Badiou writes: 
There exists no contradiction in principle between the mode of capitalist 
exploitation and the edification of permanent workers’ organisations, which aim 
to intervene in the process of the fluctuation of the price of the labour force and 
in the incessant transformations of the rate of surplus value (Badiou 2012, pp. 
188-189). 
Not only did union campaigns function to stabilise society and control prices (Badiou 
2012, p. 189), these campaigns were increasingly waged, and often explicitly so, in the 
name of a “native” class of French worker whose working and living conditions were 
won and maintained at the expense of a significant underclass of immigrant workers. 
Worse still, with the onset of protracted economic crises in the early 1970’s and rising 
unemployment throughout the decade, the PCF-CGT decided to demonise immigrant 
workers so as to increase support amongst the “French” working class (UCFML 1981b, 
p. 3). For the Maoists, the Communists’ opportunistic fear mongering was of a piece 
with the chauvinism they had displayed throughout post-War anti-colonial struggles, 
most notably the Algerian War. They were therefore poorly placed to aid what was 
perhaps the most radical political force of the post-’68 years in France: the growing 
number of struggles waged by immigrant workers, such as the rent strike in the 
SONACOTRA hostels—a struggle to which we will soon turn.11  
For all of these reasons, a space had opened up to the left of the PCF-CGT in the pre- 
and post-’68 period. But this space would have remained empty had it not been filled 
by movements or events that attested to the existence of a consequent political force 
that was communist in nature but opposed to the existing communist party 
apparatuses. This was the space that the Shanghai Commune of 1967 filled, at least for 
Badiou and the UCFML. As is well known, the Commune involved rebel workers, 
students and revolutionary party leaders overthrowing the local communist party in 
Shanghai and establishing a Commune modelled on the Paris Commune of 1871. For 
Badiou and the UCFML, this event, however fragile and fleeting, constituted the first 
sign that a new period had begun in the history of egalitarian political movements. That 
France’s own revolt against the PCF and the CGT began just a year later could only add 
to their sense that a page had been turned in the book of communist history. In short, 
the Maoism of Badiou and the UCFML began as an attempt to be faithful to the promise 
of these two events. As the Group write in ‘Ten Years of Maoism’: 
Our convictions […] are rooted in the experience, the universal significance and 
the assessment of the Cultural Revolution. Between the years 1966 and 1976, 
but above all between 1966 and 1969, the revolution in China saw the first mass 
political revolts against the new revisionist bourgeoisie that was present both in 
the Party and in the State (UCFML 1981a, 30). 
                                                        






What came first, then, for the UCFML, were “mass political revolts”. Then, in second 
place, came their analysis of these “revolts” in terms of what they meant for Marxism: 
“Mao gave the first indications, from a Marxist perspective, of what the novelty of this 
revolutionary class struggle consisted in”. However, as the UCFML went on to write, 
“our definition of Maoism, tied as it is to our political experience, has deepened and 
developed” (UCFML 1981a, 30). Indeed, as we will see further on, whatever clarity 
Mao’s writings brought to these novel political events, the UCFML strictly delimited 
the role Mao could play in their political imaginary, tactics and strategy: the Shanghai 
Commune always took pride of place in their conception of the political stakes of the 
new conjuncture.  
That said, Badiou and the UCFML were in fact distinguished within the field of French 
Maoism by the importance they accorded the Commune. While references to China 
and to Mao were a constant in French Maoist circles, these references meant different 
things to different people depending on their political background; their reading of 
events from the Cultural Revolution and May ’68; and their relation to existing 
institutions on the French left. The Shanghai Commune was in no way a common point 
of reference, nor was its signification fixed. Indeed, the relation of subordination the 
UCFML instituted between such “revolts” and Mao Tse-tung Thought was most 
certainly not common. Thus, while we have so described the field of French Maoism in 
broad terms, we must now mark out the lines of division within it so as to bring out the 
singularity of Badiou and the UCFML’s Maoism. To do this, we will contrast the Group 
with the two other most significant Maoist groups: the PCMLF and the GP.  
* 
We will begin with the PCMLF. Those who founded this party in 1967 were members 
of an older generation of Communist militants who fundamentally agreed with the 
strategy and tactics of the PCF, even if they were deeply dissatisfied with its post-
Stalinist practices (Bourseiller 2008, p. 96). For representative figures such as 
François Marty, who had fought in the Resistance and been disappointed when the 
PCF downed its arms following the Liberation, Maoism was a shot in the arm of good 
old Leninism and Stalinism. As Bourseiller writes, Marty was one of a family of 
Communists who “supported Bolshevist positions, applauded the Soviet intervention 
in Hungary and criticized destalinization” (Bourseiller 2008, p. 55). Importantly, the 
old guard in the PCMLF leadership were inspired by the Sino-Soviet split, not by the 
Cultural Revolution, towards which they were highly ambivalent (Bourseiller 2008, p. 
54). But the PCMLF’s leadership was also made up of those who had been active during 
the Algerian War of Independence and had supported the FLN. For this second family 
of militants, their entrance into Maoism was made less by way of a fidelity to Stalinism 
and more by a sense that their Third Worldist convictions were best expressed by a 
political movement emanating from the world’s most powerful Third World country—
a country that also appeared to possess a dynamic communist culture (Bourseiller 
2008, p. 55). A figure like Jacques Jurquet was exemplary of this group of militants. 
Bourseiller describes his trajectory as follows:  
When the Algerian War broke out, [Jurquet] came into conflict with the line of 
the PCF, which had agreed to vote for the special powers demanded by the 
government of the socialist Guy Mollet. Then the crisis between China and the 
USSR broke out. The staunchly Third Worldist positions of the Chinese could 
not but seduce him (Bourseiller 2008, p. 57).  
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Troubled by the growing popularity of Maoism, from 1963 onwards the PCF set out to 
disband all existing ‘Associations d’amitié franco-chinoise’. Ironically, the members of 
these ‘Associations’ had been instructed by Peking to work within the PCF, not against 
it (Bourseiller 2008, p. 57). In a further irony, despite being violently attacked by the 
PCF’s paramilitary wing—Jacques Jurquet, for instance, had to travel everywhere with 
a loaded revolver and a large dog (Bourseiller 2008, p. 61)—the PCMLF decided that it 
was necessary to create a party modelled on that of their enemies, the PCF. Badiou 
registers this irony in his own description of the PCMLF: 
I believe there have been three different interpretations of Maoism in France. 
The first, and the oldest, was that, contrary to the USSR under Khrushchev, 
China held on to an original hardline Stalinism—and that the abandonment of 
Stalinism would lead sooner or later to a general dissolution (in which regard 
they weren’t mistaken). These people started the PCMLF believing they would 
rebuild a genuine Communist party of class struggle, against the revisionism of 
the official PCF and the USSR. It was both a dogmatic and a nostalgic 
interpretation (Badiou 2008, pp. 13-131). 
There were other reasons, besides a general conservatism on the part of an older 
generation of communists, for the PCMLF leadership’s decision to construct a party 
that resembled the PCF. At this time, despite their nascent organisation being small 
and isolated, the PCMLF could look to other Mao-inspired parties being formed all 
across Europe and the wider world: a new communist international seemed to be in 
the offing. Moreover, if the Chinese took any notice of the PCMLF at all, it was because 
they demanded that a single party represent their line in each country: “Why this 
favourable treatment”, Bourseiller asks, “which touched the PCMLF to the exclusion of 
other pro-Chinese groups? Quite simply because Kang Sheng and Jiang Qing, Mao’s 
wife, were partisans of the monopoly of representation” (Bourseiller 2008, p. 204). 
The PCMLF was thus playing a long game, restricting its operations in France in the 
hope the party would eventually be elected France’s representative in a post-Soviet 
communist international. 
Following the events of May ’68, the PCMLF was banned by the French government. 
The party decided to continue in a clandestine manner, a strategy that destined it to 
irrelevance and impotence since it inevitably brought out its most Bolshevist 
tendencies, which contradicted the libertarian spirit of May ’68. Of those young 
student recruits who flowed into the organisation after the May events, most were 
dismayed by a party committed to an iron discipline that led nowhere, not least because 
of the French state’s over-the-top reaction against it (Bourseiller 2008, p. 199).  
The PCMLF dissolved early in 1970, its members splitting into ‘Front Rouge’ and the 
PCML, which itself split into the PCRML and the PCOF. In Badiou’s eyes, the PCMLF 
had fatally blunted the efficacy of its actions by subordinating its politics to the Chinese 
state. By contrast, the UCFML, rather than wagering on the future existence of a new 
communist international centred on Peking, preferred to privilege the application of 
lessons inspired by the Cultural Revolution to local French struggles, such as the plight 
of immigrant workers. As the ‘Group’ write in their retrospective text ‘Ten Years of 
Maoism’: 
In contradistinction to certain groups like the PCMLF, we owe absolutely 





has never been a model to follow. What founds our judgement is rooted in our 
own experience, that is, in the creative application of Marxism-Leninism-
Maoism to the concrete conditions of revolution in France. (UCFML 1981a, p. 
49).  
For the UCFML, what legitimised and motivated political action was not the existence 
of a powerful state that proclaimed to be the incorruptible incarnation of the political 
principles of a mummified revolution. Rather, as we already know, it was the existence 
of mass movements that verified the real efficacy of these principles, such as the 
Shanghai Commune. On this point, the UCFML understood themselves to be reprising 
a gesture performed before them by Lenin; a gesture whose meaning had been 
obscured by the time of the Third International: 
The reference to China, in terms of the international communist movement, is 
not a reference to the Chinese state, nor even, in a central way, to the 
characteristics of Chinese society. It is a reference to class struggle in China, to 
its antagonistic explosion. […] In truth, this is not radically new: even if the 
Third International sometimes seemed to forget it, its very existence did not 
have its origin in the objective existence of the Soviet State, but in the universal 
lessons of the Revolution of October 1917. Further back still, Lenin was educated 
by the French proletariat and the experience of the Paris Commune (UCFML 
1981a, p. 51).  
And now the UCFML were educating themselves at the school of the Chinese 
proletariat, in particular the Shanghai proletariat of 1967. The reference in the above 
passage to the “antagonistic explosion” of the Commune echoes the passage from 
Theory of the Subject we quoted at the beginning of this paper. Both the Shanghai 
Commune and May ’68 verified the existence of a progressive force committed not only 
to communism, but to the overthrow of the existing communist bureaucracy. As such, 
both were nascent forms of what Mao called “antagonistic contradiction”. With their 
studied indifference to the Chinese state, the UCFML sought out other mass 
movements in France that might verify the possibility of communist movements that 
would follow a very different path from what had become the revisionism, racism, 
corruption and compromise of the PCF-CGT. Such was the case with their long-term 
support of the SONACOTRA rent strike movement, where tens of thousands of 
immigrant workers organised to improve their housing conditions and working rights 
(UCFML 1981b).  
Returning to the PCMLF, in the theoretical terms Badiou uses in Theory of the Subject 
the party represented a “rightist deviation” (TOTS 12): not only had their leadership 
fallen back on a party model that had proven ineffective in France; their nostalgic 
dreams of the Popular Front had led them to ignore what was truly novel both about 
post-War capitalism and the new revolutionary possibilities that had emerged in its 
wake (UCFML 1981a, p. 42). Specifically, the PCMLF had failed to be receptive to the 
novelty of the post-GPCR and post-May ’68 context—a novelty that was both on the 
side of potential alliances, such as with immigrant workers, and on the side of enemies. 
While they seemed to be opposed to the PCF, the PCMLF had reprised so many 
elements of the Communist’s organisational model that they had become the PCF’s 
diminutive mirror image. Most egregiously, they had failed to learn what Badiou and 
the UCFML considered the key lesson of events like the Shanghai Commune: that true 
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communists could and should struggle against—and not with or on the model of — 
existing communist parties.  
That said, the UCFML did not condone a pure revolt against the party as an end in 
itself. In fact, they affirmed the irreducible necessity of organisation. Badiou even goes 
so far as to claim that the organisation of proletarian politics is the most significant 
innovation of modern-day Marxism. This is what had allowed it to advance beyond 
previous forms of egalitarian politics: 
… Marxism-Leninism presupposes a phenomenon of the accumulation of new 
ideas, which are antagonistic to the dominant order […] These conditions are 
fulfilled as soon as there exists a permanent capacity to overcome the dispersion 
of experiences and to elaborate a subjective force that is neither sporadic nor 
tied to a particular episode of the class struggle, but which operates as the place 
in which an assessment is made of the experiences of all successive struggles 
(Badiou 2012, p. 179). 
If the UCFML combatted the PCMLF on its “right”, it was therefore not in the name of 
an aversion to organisation. But despite their support for the party form, Badiou and 
the UCFML did not set out to establish a party in abstraction from existing struggles, 
as the PCMLF did. Rather, they attempted to bring the question of the constitution of 
a “communist party of a new type” (UCFML 1981b, p. 5) into the heart of contemporary 
political movements, such as the SONACOTRA rent strike. In other words, they sought 
to make the constitution of a party a key strategic question, offering it up as a matter 
of collective debate. This explains the long list of supplementary substantives at the 
beginning of the UCFML’s full name—a list that stands in the precise place where the 
founders of the PCMLF had presumptively put the word “Party”: that is, the UCFML 
were not a party, but only a group whose political work consisted in unifying all those 
who could be convinced that a “communist party of a new type” would eventually be 
necessary if they were to succeed in their struggles. For instance, during the 
SONACOTRA rent strike, while always supporting the directives of the movement’s 
own ‘Comité de coordination’, members of the UCFML encouraged strikers to steadily 
extend the domain of their struggle to the rest of French society and to organise 
alongside native French people. As their text ‘The Political History of the SONACOTRA 
Hostels’ explains: “the UCFML is an organisation whose political project is to construct 
in France the party of the international proletariat” (UCFML 1981b, p. 113). In Theory 
of the Subject Badiou himself affirms this project: “The whole question of 
contemporary politics comes down to this: is the international proletariat of France 
going to exist?” (Badiou 2009, p. 311). Events like the Shanghai Commune and their 
uncertain echoes in France gave the UCFML reasons to think that a “communist party 
of a new type”—one that exposed and transcended the PCF-CGT’s conservatism and 
chauvinism—could indeed come into being. But most importantly, the nature of these 
events meant that this party did indeed have to be a “party of a new type”. How, in 
other words, could a movement whose aim was to break apart the parties of the Third 
International eventually institute a novel form of communist organisation? For Badiou 
and the UCFML, Mao was indeed a theorist of a new party form. Paraphrasing the 
Chairman’s writings on the topic, Badiou states: “From the party to the masses, in 
which it installs and unlimits itself, the trajectory never crosses a stable frontier” 
(Badiou 2009, p. 91). In other words, following Mao’s summation of the lessons of the 
Cultural Revolution, there was to be no “stable frontier” between the agents of a mass 





to the scene of a political struggle. As we will see further on, Badiou articulates a Mao-
inspired ethics of “confidence” to orient this precarious process. In contrast to the 
PCMLF, for the UCFML Mao was not, therefore, a new Stalin—a hardline communist 
leader capable of arresting the decline of the international communist movement by 
virtue of his elevated position within a powerful party apparatus. Rather, what counted 
for them were events like the Shanghai Commune. Mao was important only insofar as 
he was the theorist of these events—the person who thought through their 
consequences in real time. And when the UCFML did associate Mao with the question 
of the party, it was only insofar as he conceived of a party that was “post-Leninist” 
(UCFML 1981a, p. 6); a party, in other words, that had learnt the lessons of the 
Commune’s break with the Third International’s communist parties.  
* 
We now turn to the GP. Despite their official recognition by Peking and the exquisite 
communist credentials of some of its leadership, the PCMLF were well behind the GP 
in terms of numbers and—perhaps most importantly—public exposure. Indeed, the GP 
have a particular importance for Badiou since he believes that their reading of the post-
’68 situation, the tactics they employed and the nature of their leaders were doomed in 
advance to give rise to the kind of renegacy witnessed among many prominent French 
intellectuals in the late-1970’s. The GP were formed after the UJCML (Union des 
jeunesses communistes marxistes-léninistes) was banned by the French government 
following May ’68 (Bourseiller 2008, pp. 151-156). The new group brought together 
former militants from the UJC alongside more libertarian-minded members of the 
‘Mouvement du 22 Mars’, most notably the students Alain Geismar and Serge July. It 
was led by a group of charismatic young petty bourgeois and bourgeois students and 
intellectuals including Benny Lévy, Tony Lévy, Olivier Rolin, Jean-Pierre le Dantec, 
and the two aforementioned students—all of whom would go on to play prominent 
roles in French political and cultural life following their involvement in the Maoist 
movement. The GP employed very different tactics to the PCMLF; tactics that Badiou 
describes as terroristic or anarchistic: 
…the ultra-left interpretation of Maoism of the GP was almost anarchist: you 
launched bold attacks, set up stunts, made ‘revolution in the head’, ‘melted into 
the masses’, always with a very keen eye to the media. The organization was 
highly centralized—in secret; in public it dissolved itself every five minutes in 
order to ‘liberate’ the energy of the masses (Badiou 2008, p. 131). 
As both Bourseiller and Badiou claim, the GP’s terroristic, violent but principally 
spectacular activities—street ambushes of the police, kidnappings, lootings of 
expensive Parisian stores—were geared towards making visible the lines of fracture in 
France at the time, in particular the PCF-CGT’s collusion with the “old bourgeoisie”. 
But with the repressive measures their activities provoked, the GP also hoped to 
demonstrate the objective weakness of the French state. All of this was done in order 
to inspire the working class to take the revolution into their own hands (Bourseiller 
2008, p. 154). If the French state had to mobilise the CRS to control a small group of 
students, surely it was secretly weak and could easily be overthrown by an organised 
revolt of workers? All of the GP’s activities were therefore performed beneath the 
implicit gaze of a slumbering proletariat, a revolutionary class that needed only to be 
convinced of its own strength. In terms of the ethical orientations Badiou identifies in 
Theory of the Subject, the GP were partisans of “belief” (Badiou 2009, p. 327): that is, 
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they posited the substantial existence of a subject of communist politics: the working 
class. It was only within such a horizon of “belief” that their destructive actions made 
any strategic sense. This meant that there were points on which the GP resembled the 
UCFML, and others where it was unquestionably distinct from it. On the one hand, in 
contrast to the PCMLF, the GP shared with the UCFML the conviction that they could 
not elect themselves as leaders of the working class’ political party; they could at best 
sacrifice themselves in its service. Bourseiller describes this aspect of the GP’s strategy 
as follows: 
This is the essential difference that separated the GP from the PCMLF: for 
Benny Lévy’s organisation, the communist Party is not yet formed. It has to be 
born spontaneously from struggles, at the heart of strikes and protests. The 
revolutionaries’ role is not to abstractly constitute a self-proclaimed party, but 
to put themselves at the service of the people in order to rouse it and orient 
towards the founding of the party. There is, in the spontaneist interpretation of 
Maoism, a messianic dimension. One endlessly awaits the spontaneous creation 
of the party, for such a creation will signify the immanence of the red dawn; but 
one prohibits oneself from rushing ahead of the working class’ desires 
(Bourseiller 2008, pp. 154-155). 
As we will see below, the UCFML absolutely rejected the implicitly “messianic” side of 
the GP’s politics. Yet, they too read Mao’s injunctions to “serve the people” and “have 
confidence in the people” as prohibiting them from constituting a party without the 
masses’ initiative. For both groups, Maoism meant rejecting the elitism implicit in the 
Leninist model of the party. 
On the other hand, however, for Badiou and the UCFML the GP’s fatal philosophical 
error lay in their “belief” in the substantial existence of the working class qua an 
essentially revolutionary force. Badiou remarks on the GP’s “conviction that the 
Maoists were in a position to take power or at least to overturn the situation very 
rapidly” (Badiou 2008, p. 129): it was as if the extraordinary historical example of Mao 
and the Cultural Revolution had transmitted a promise to them; a promise that the 
working class revolution was at hand. For the UCFML, by contrast, there was no 
imagined addressee called the working class that was sunk in a temporary state of 
impotence. Instead, all political action had to be undertaken in the midst of existing 
mass movements, which they themselves had not artificially sparked. Moreover, they 
believed they had to engage with the concrete concerns of localised political 
movements, even if they still argued within them for the strategic necessity of a party 
and of pursuing a communist politics. As they write in ‘Ten Years of Maoism’, “the 
antagonism has to be constituted from the point of view of the masses themselves and 
supported by a directing kernel that is internal to this subjectivity” (UCFML 1981a, p. 
12). There was no sense in engaging in the kind of activities the GP promoted, since 
these were completely cut off from actual movements. The GP could justify their 
practices from a communist perspective only insofar as they believed that the working 
class would eventually take up the struggle in the midst of the mayhem the GP’s 
members had unleashed. In the meantime, however, what resulted from the group’s 
actions was an infinite cycle of violence in which nothing new could ever come into 
existence: the GP became ever more provocative, the French state ever more 
repressive. As Bourseiller writes, “the attitude of the forces of order under the reign of 
Georges Pompidou was ultimately characterised by a clumsy and exaggerated 





2008, p. 175). In Theory of the Subject, Badiou obliquely approaches the GP’s model 
of political action by way of the Sophoclean couple of Antigone and Creon, which he 
correlates with two psychoanalytical concepts, anxiety and superego. Following Lacan, 
Badiou sees anxiety as provoked by the loss of any stable symbolic point of reference. 
The superego, for its part, is a figure who stands less for the symbolic law per se and 
instead for the senseless violence that is required to supplement it in the face of its own 
porosity or incompleteness. On this model, the GP dissolved the symbolic law by way 
of hysterical provocations, but in doing so it both provoked anxiety and brought forth 
a superego-like figure, which took the form of Pompidou’s forces of law and order. In 
other words, the GP’s actions inevitably mobilised the state’s repressive apparatus in 
the same way a neurotic’s fear of a symbolic space insufficiently governed by norms 
gives rise to a paralysing superegoic guilt; or the way a “hysteric” like Antigone calls 
forth a figure like Creon (Lacan 1997). In short, both psychoanalytically and politically, 
anxiety and the superego are indissoluble. Badiou describes the apparent 
“contradiction” between these two forces as follows: “The contradiction is tragic 
insofar as it leaves no way out other than death. Why? Because it is not governed by 
any new right” (Badiou 2009, p. 163). By contrast, Badiou’s Group sought to act under 
the sign of what he describes as Aeschylus’ two figures of the courage and justice: that 
is, while they believed it was inevitable for a revolutionary politics to confront both 
anxiety and the superego, particularly insofar as such a politics minimally involved 
violating the existing law, they also thought it had to go beyond this destructive pairing 
and courageously construct an entirely new law—a “new right”, or “justice” (Badiou 
2009, p. 160), as Badiou puts it in the simplest terms possible. For instance, while the 
SONACOTRA rent strike movement certainly suffered the full force of the state’s 
repressive apparatus at the same time as it provoked the immigrant worker’s anxiety 
by situating them, for the movement’s duration, in an extra-legal zone situated 
between their status as guest workers and their hoped-for status as future citizens of a 
thoroughly transformed French polity, ideally this simultaneous invocation of anxiety 
and the superego would also have inspired their courage to live, think and act in ways 
that could not be rendered intelligible by the terms of the old law but only in the light 
of a new and “just” law. In practice, this would have involved, first, allowing the 
movement to consolidate itself through organisational forms that would have helped 
it persevere once its demands had provoked the repressive response of the state; and 
second, deepening and enriching these organisational forms by permitting them to be 
shaped by principles that were neither simply disciplinary nor pragmatic, but involved 
hitherto unseen forms of acting, working and thinking in common that would have 
permitted hitherto unseen or even “impossible” forms of connection between the 
strikers’ particular grievances and the broader, global struggle of a “generic” humanity 
against capitalism and imperialism (UCFML 1981b, pp. 78-92). In light of this strategy, 
we can see how Badiou and the UCFML’s political engagement can be read using 
Badiou’s schematism of the four necessary subjective figures: anxiety, superego, 
courage and justice. The GP, by contrast, remained trapped at the level of the first dyad, 
thereby never passing beyond to the second. 
These four subjective figures also allow us to better understand the meaning of 
Badiou’s explicit invocations of Mao’s name in Theory of the Subject and in the 
UCFML’s publications. So far we have seen how Mao’s writings were secondary to the 
“antagonistic explosion” of events like the Shanghai Commune. Yet in reading Badiou 
and the UCFML’s writings from this period it is impossible not to notice their 
extraordinary degree of investment in the proper name of Mao Tse-tung. To take just 
one example, in Theory of the Subject, after writing that “the masses experience […] 
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the socialist State and the party at its helm [as] a rat’s nest of bourgeois bureaucrats”, 
Badiou affirms that it “belongs to Mao’s imperishable initiative” (Badiou 2009, p. 82) 
to have called for a politics that would overthrow this party. Indeed, it frequently seems 
as if, without Mao’s intervention, the contemporary stakes of communist politics would 
have never come into view: “Mao has posited for the first time that there is no hope in 
engendering communism in a linear fashion from the socialist State” (Badiou 2009, p. 
88). Did Badiou and the UCFML share the GP’s intrinsically theological conception of 
Mao and of the politics he inspired? 
The four subjective figures Badiou delineates in Theory of the Subject help us to answer 
this question. As we know, the encounter with the law’s instability is an obligatory 
point of passage for the political subject. Both the Shanghai Commune and the 
SONACOTRA rent strike brought out a point of impossibility in the space of world 
politics: that of the existence of a communist politics that was not subordinate to the 
“new bureaucratic bourgeoisie” But in order for the courage of these two political 
subjects not to devolve into anxiety, they inevitably required, Badiou argued, a fixed 
point of reference with which to sustain themselves. This fixed point, which provided 
a transcendent guarantee for the precarious process of constructing a “new right”, was 
of course, imaginary. Indeed, it was imaginary in two senses of the term: firstly, it did 
not exist; and secondly, it implied, as per Lacan’s imaginary, the false predicate of 
plenitude. Nevertheless, if the derivative, insubstantial and precarious nature of this 
imaginary figure is properly understood and controlled, invoking such an imaginary 
fixed point need not be a politically disastrous move. Badiou captures this point in the 
following passage from Theory of the Subject:  
…there is nothing more structural and, in the last instance, nothing more 
impoverished than the imaginary […] At the same time, I confess that the 
pressure of the imaginary, once we recognize its principle, by no means 
demands that we become scandalized. Even the famous ‘cult of personality’, in 
its manifest correlation to the oblique anxieties of just bravery, seems to me to 
stem from the inevitable presumption of the One much more so than from the 
dictatorial infamies which pass for real and which if needed are compatible with 
the most mediocre images. Nobody has ever needed the cult of Guy Mollet’s 
personality in order to give their massive consent, during the Algerian war, to 
the massacre of a million Algerians, including torture and the camps (Badiou, 
2009, p. 302). 
In other words, what defines a politics is not the presence or absence of an imaginary 
figure of plenitude that presides over it. The latter is, at best, a supplement, albeit one 
that is both necessary and dangerous. For the same reason, for Badiou and the UCFML 
what was essential to their Maoism was not the proper name or personality of Mao. 
Rather, it was events like the Shanghai Commune and their equivalents in France; 
events that broke apart the old law that had previously governed the space of political 
possibility and, in doing so, marked the inception of a process by which a new law, a 
new egalitarian social dispensation, might be constructed. Mao was only the minimal 
mark of unicity they used to group these events together. For at root, these events 
involved all four subjective figures: an anxious dissolution of the law; the violent 
backlash of the superego; the courage to act without the law (that is, not only illegally, 
but in ways diagonal to all that had previously passed for knowledge—of justice, of 
politics, of being-in-common); and the pursuit of communist justice. The UCFML’s 





their anxiety was kept at bay and their courage sustained by reference to a supposedly 
transcendent point: namely, Mao Tse-tung Thought (Badiou 2009, p. 298). All of the 
above allows Badiou to present the following retrospective overview of his involvement 
in the Maoist movement: 
I certainly participated in the ‘cult of Mao’, by means of which I, like millions 
more, figured the fixed point with which to gauge the radical turnabout of 
courage and the complete transformation of both my practical existence and my 
convictions during the second half of the 1960s and the early 70s – years of 
grandeur if ever there were any. In retrospect, I have come to know its ridiculous 
aspects, the unrealities of the subjective trajectory by which this cult traced an 
imaginary diagonal and which, exposed to the real, I can now designate with 
clarity. But I confess that I feel no remorse whatsoever for having traversed this 
experience, not even for nourishing an uncontrollable nostalgia when I 
remember those years […] As for the leftists of the post-68 era, I consider them 
less the victims of a devastating illusion, as they pretend today, than carried 
away beyond themselves by history, from whence they drew certain images, 
unifying consequences and not only the illusory cause of their determination 
(Badiou 2009, pp. 302-303). 
As Badiou argues here, Mao and the figure of intellectual and political plenitude he 
represented was not the “cause” of French Maoism. He thus concludes: “The imaginary 
comes in to consolidate the real and not in order to install the semblant” (Badiou 2009, 
p. 303). In other words, in the political subject’s encounter with the real, understood 
as an encounter with the law’s inconsistency, a figure like Mao serves a limited though 
undeniable pragmatic purpose. The “cult of Mao” was therefore a sideshow relative to 
the true theatre of Maoist action. 
While the invocation of Mao in the UCFML’s discourse might well seem to function as 
a species of catechism, the Group strictly refused to engage in any apotheosis of Mao, 
just as they refused the GP’s “belief” in the existence of a latently revolutionary working 
class. Arguably, this allowed the UCFML to maintain their political commitments well 
beyond the GP’s short though spectacular lifespan. Even Bourseiller remarks on the 
UCFML’s “extraordinary longevity” (Bourseiller 2008, p. 215). As Badiou argues, the 
GP’s “belief”, by contrast, was destined to evaporate the moment it became clear the 
proletariat—their proletariat—did not exist. Of course, it was not as if Badiou and the 
UCMFL refused to accept the existence of a mass of exploited workers. But they did 
refuse the idea that progressive political consequences necessarily flowed from the 
“weak difference” between bourgeoisie and proletariat qua economically-defined 
classes. Failing to grasp this point meant that the GP’s members were doomed to 
disappointment—but also to eventually denouncing, when the historical (and 
mediatic) tide turned, their youthful dogmatic belief. As Badiou writes in 1979, many 
years after the GP had dissipated and its most prominent members had become 
renegades: “Now they tell us they had taken ‘the masses’ as a master signifier. This is 
correct” (TOTS 327). While prominent figures like André Glucksmann set about 
portraying Marxism (from its German Idealist origins) as a royal road to the gulag, 
such as in Les maîtres penseurs (1977), for Badiou the “Marxism” which Glucksmann 
celebrated and then execrated was never more than the Marxism of the GP: an 
incoherent Messianism based on a spurious social ontology and a self-defeating 
strategy. The GP, therefore, was correct to denounce itself, but incorrect when they 
mistook this auto-critique for having revealed some original sin of any theory of praxis 
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which dared to break with what Badiou would later denounce as “capitalo-
parliamentarianism”. But the GP’s Marxism was not, and never had been, the only 
Marxism; indeed, for Badiou and the UCFML, the GP’s political strategy rested upon a 
fundamental misunderstanding not only of Marx, but of Mao’s innovations and 
clarifications. To the GP’s discourse of “belief”, Badiou therefore opposes his own Mao-
inspired discourse of “confidence”:  
From 1976 onward, our intellectuals have lost confidence en masse, arguing 
instead—without being totally wrong about this—that they had never been more 
than believers. Does one always have to believe in order to have confidence? As 
far as I am concerned, I have confidence in the people and in the working class 
in direct proportion to my lack of belief in them (Badiou 2009, p. 322).  
To have confidence in the people, as Mao demanded, was, the UCFML believed, to 
wager that everyone was capable of playing a part in the constitution of a political party. 
By establishing their own groups by fiat, and by doing so at an almost absolute distance 
from the true site of contemporary political struggles in France, both the PCMLF and 
the GP, their rhetoric and disavowals notwithstanding, had taken an elitist path: they 
had thereby betrayed what the UCFML believed was an essential element in the 
message of Mao and the Cultural Revolution. They had also misunderstood what Mao’s 
reference to “confidence” actually meant, at least as far as Badiou was concerned: 
namely, that there was no straight path from social being (even an exploited social 
being) to emancipation; only a precarious, haphazard yet committed process of 
purification by which political movements progressively stripped themselves of 
everything that made them homogeneous to the status quo counted as political action. 
Only such a process gave them a chance of achieving their egalitarian aims; aims which 
were both invisible and nonsensical to the logic which governed and sustained the 
present situation. The only appropriate attitude in such circumstances was 
“confidence”; a “confidence” that applied to a movement’s capacity to verify, point by 
point, the fact that true equality was not beyond the bounds of the possible—or, more 
precisely, that it was not beyond the bounds of the political subject’s capacity to make 
what was currently impossible possible. According to Badiou, the GP’s leaders gave up 
the moment they started to believe that the object of their former faith, the 
revolutionary working class, was incapable of sweeping them to power. For GP leaders 
like Gérard and Jacques-Alain Miller to disengage from political action at the point 
they did meant they were “people who saw their undertaking not as the start of a long 
journey with a great deal of ebb and flow, but as an avenue towards power” (Badiou 
2008, p. 126). In other words, despite their invocation of the Maoist slogan to “get off 
their horse”, the GP leaders had never truly de-classed themselves: they had retained 
a sense of social election. Riding the wave of Maoism and its related struggles in France 
had simply been a false start in what they considered their inevitable ascension to 
power. By contrast, the UCFML promised nothing—neither to those it struggled with, 
nor to its own leadership: 
As was said during the central intervention of the UCFML at the meeting of the 
28th of February, 1981, we promise nothing. As a consequence, there is no reason 
to follow us, nor to be disappointed by us. Against our own possible deviations, 
against our own possible degeneration, there is no other guarantee than the 
work that is done to bring about a political maturity—in the working class, 
amongst the people, and also amongst the democrats—on the question of the 





And just as they promised nothing, so it should be said that Mao promised nothing to 
the UCFML. For not only did they reject the deification of the Chinese leader, which 
ran rampant elsewhere, their refusal of the GP’s politics of “belief” entailed refusing 
any teleological conception of political action. This is the sense for Badiou of Mao’s 
maxim: “Success, failure, new success, new failure, and thus all the way to the final 
victory”, a maxim Badiou qualifies by stating: “There is no final victory that is not 
relative. Every victory is the beginning of a failure of a new type” (Badiou 2009, p. 91). 
If there was a promise anywhere in Badiou and the UCFML’s political theory, it was 
the one made by the Shanghai Commune, May ’68 and movements like the 
SONACOTRA rent strike—the promise that the space of political possibility was not 
exhausted by the “grey tyranny” which had been the ignominious fate of the parties of 
the Third International. Yet, this promise itself was nothing outside of the efforts the 
UCFML made to verify its efficacy in concrete situations; efforts that were guided by 
the lessons of the Shanghai Commune, which Mao codified but which substantially 
revised the Leninist conception of the party and prohibited both messianism and 
elitism. In short, in their submission of the proper name of Mao to the event of the 
Shanghai Commune, Badiou and the UCFML’s invocations of the Great Helmsman 
were ultimately subordinated to the goal of dispensing with any Great Helmsman in 
politics, now and in the future.  
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